NAVAL AND ARMY MUTINY OF 1946
by Maj Gen VK Singh, veteran
I find a lot of articles highlighting the role of the Naval Mutiny in 1946. Someone even advised Shri Parrikar and Shri Jaitley to read up everything about the Naval Mutiny in 1946. What about the Army Mutiny at STC Jabalpur at almost the same time? Unfortunately it has not been well publicized and most people are unaware of its repercussions. At that time the Navy was a minuscule force and had almost no role in maintaining the security of India. But an Army mutiny really shocked the British.
In 2007-08, I did a research project under the aegis of the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research, which is part of the United Service Institution of India. At end of the project, a book titled CONTRIBUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES TO THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN INDIA was published in 2009, by KW Publishers, New Delhi. This covers all the mutinies in India, starting from the Vellore mutiny of 1806 up to Independence. I am giving below extracts from chapter 11 (The Soldier's Contribution to Indian Independence). References are given in brackets after the relevant paragraph/sentence. If anyone is interested in reading the entire chapter, you can see it on my blogveekay's history book: veekay-militaryhistory.blogspot.com/. I have also posted chapters dealing with all the three mutinies – in the Navy, Army and RIAF.
EXTTRACTS FROM CH 11 (The Soldier's Contribution to Indian Independence)
The year 1946 opened with serious cases of disaffection in all three armed services, which have been described in earlier chapters. In the last week of March the Cabinet Mission, comprising Sir Stafford Cripps, the President of the Board of Trade; Mr. A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty; and Lord Pethick Lawrence, the Secretary of State, arrived in Delhi, with the task of reaching an agreement with the principal political parties on two issues: one, the method of framing a constitution for a self-governing, independent India and two, the setting up of a new Executive Council of Interim Government that would hold office while the constitution was being drafted. The Viceroy was fully involved in the deliberation of the Cabinet Mission, but the problem of the disaffection in the armed services caused him not a little anxiety. In a dispatch addressed to King George VI on 22 March 1946, he wrote:
The last three months have been anxious and depressing. They have been marked by continuous and unbridled abuse of the Government, of the British, of officials and police, in political speeches, in practically the whole of the Press, and in the Assembly; by serious rioting in Bombay; by a mutiny in the RIN, much indiscipline in the RIAF; some unrest in the Army; by an unprecedented drought and famine conditions over many parts of India; by threatened strikes on the Railways, and in the Posts and Telegraphs; by a general sense of insecurity and lawlessness. …….
The most disturbing feature of all is that unrest is beginning to appear in some units of the Indian Army; so far almost entirely in the technical arms. Auchinleck thinks that the great mass of the Indian Army is still sound, and I believe that this is so. It may not take long, however, to shake their steadiness if the Congress and Muslim League determine to use the whole power of propaganda at their command to do so. (Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London) vi, pp. 1233-37.)
On 27 March 1946 Sir J.A. Thorne, the Home Member of the Viceroy's Council, was asked to prepare a brief appreciation of what would happen if the Cabinet Mission does not achieve a settlement. One of the important points covered was the staunchness of the Indian Services if called upon to quell civil disturbances. According to Thorne's appreciation, which he submitted on 5 April, the loyalty of the Services could no longer be taken for granted. In the 1942 disturbances the Services were nearly 100 percent staunch, but this would not be so on a future occasion. If faced with the prospect of firing on mobs, not all units could be relied upon. As regards the behaviour that could be expected of troops generally under these circumstances, there would be a lot of disaffection, and downright mutiny, especially in the RIAF, RIN and Signals units. Thorne suggested that an appreciation on these aspects be prepared by the War Department. (Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London) vii, p. 150)
The Commander-in-Chief directed the Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier B.P.T. O'Brien, to assess the present state morale and degree of reliability of the three Indian fighting services, with special reference to the Indian Commissioned Officers, from the point of view of their capacity to under three conditions – in aid of civil power in widespread communal or ant-present-Government disturbances; in operations on the Frontier; and as garrisons overseas. The Director of Military Intelligence submitted the Note to the Commander-in-Chief on 25 April, who expressed his general agreement with its contents. Extracts from the Note are given below: (Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London) vii, pp. 406-407.)
........We consider that the Indian Services could not remain in being in the face of communal trouble started by, or turned into, a Jehad; neither can we suggest any action which might increase the likelihood of them staying firm under these circumstances.
We consider that the very great bulk of Indian Armoured Corps, Gunners, Sappers and Infantry, could be relied on to act in communal trouble not amounting to a Jehad but would advise against bringing other services in the Army, the R.I.N. or the R.I.A.F. into direct contact with rioters.
….Our views on the reliability of the Indian Services in widespread Congress inspired trouble are
(a) The Indian Armoured Corps, Gunners, Sappers and Infantry can in the main be depended on provided that their I.C.Os, particularly the senior ones, remain loyal and any waverers among them are dealt with firmly and immediately…
(b) The Indian Signal Corps cannot at present be considered reliable….
(c) The Ancillary Services of the Army as a whole should not be relied on to act against rioters…
(d) The Royal Indian Navy cannot at present be regarded as reliable….
(e) The Royal Indian Air Force must be regarded as doubtful…
….the key to the reliability of the Services, particularly the Army, is the attitude of the I.C.O. …the morale of the I.C.O. can be greatly improved by the example and attitude of British officers…
Auchinleck forwarded Brigadier O'Brien's Note to the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission, giving copies to Army Commanders as well as the Chiefs of the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force. As can be imagined, it caused considerable dismay and alarm in all quarters. Meanwhile, the Cabinet Mission requested the Viceroy for an appreciation of the situation that was likely to arise if their proposals fail and for a general policy on India in that event. In a Top Secret Memorandum dated 30 May 1946, Wavell made some interesting observations. The Congress, he felt, was determined to grasp all the power they can as quickly as possible. 'It is as if a starving prisoner was suddenly offered unlimited quantities of food…his instinct is to seize it all at once … also to eat as much and as quickly as possible, an action which is bound to have ill effects on his health'. As for Mahatma Gandhi, he was 'a pure political opportunist, and an extremely skilful one, whose guiding principle is to get rid of the hated British influence out of India as soon as possible'. Wavell warned that if the Congress and Muslim League failed to come to terms, serious communal riots may break out, with very little warning, especially in the Punjab and the 'Mutiny Provinces' of UP and Bihar. Prompt action would be required to deal with the trouble, with very little time for consultations with London. He suggested that their actions should be based on certain definite principles, the first being to give India self-government as quickly as possible without disorder and chaos breaking out. It was important that Britain should avoid a situation in which she had to withdraw from India under circumstance of ignominy after wide spread riots and attacks on Europeans, or adopt a course that could be treated as a policy of 'scuttle' or gave the appearance of weakness. While deciding the short term policy, the long-term strategic interests of Britain should be safeguarded. In the event of serious trouble, there was a military plan, which provided for holding on to the principal ports – Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Karachi – and to Delhi. Subsequently, British troops would be transferred from Southern India to the North. Stressing the need to avoid at all cost being embroiled with both Hindus and Muslims, he suggested a 'worst case' solution – to hand over the Hindu Provinces to the Congress and withdraw to the Muslim Provinces the North-West and North-East. (Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London) vii, pp. 731-737.)
Three days later, the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy sent a 'Most Immediate' telegram to the Prime Minister, stressing the urgent need for the British Government to announce a clear policy in the event of the negotiations between the Cabinet Mission and the political parties breaking down. They expected the crisis to be reached any time between 5 and 15 June, and the necessity for urgent decision on the line of action that the Viceroy was to adopt. The first point to be decided was whether they should attempt to repress a mass movement sponsored by the Congress and maintain the existing form of government. This was possible only if the Indian Army remained loyal, which was doubtful. It would also cause much bloodshed and achieve nothing, unless it was intended to stay on in India for another 10 to 20 years. At the other extreme was the decision to withdraw from the whole of India as soon as the Congress gave a call for a mass uprising. This would have an adverse impact on British prestige throughout Commonwealth. After considering several options, the Cabinet Mission opined that if negotiations did in fact break down and they were faced with serious internal disorders, the situation would have to be met by adopting one of five courses. These were (1) complete withdrawal from India as soon as possible; (2) withdrawal by a certain date; (3) an appeal to the United Nations Organisation; (4) maintaining overall control throughout India; and (5) giving independence to Southern and Central India, and maintaining the existing position in North-West and North-East India. (Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London) vii, pp. 787-795.)
The appreciations of the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission reached London while the latter were still carrying out their negotiations in Delhi and Simla. They were considered by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, which asked the Chiefs of Staff to examine the military implications of the five courses of action listed by the Cabinet Mission, keeping in mind the short-term policy and the long-term strategic interests listed by the Viceroy. The Report of the Chiefs of Staff, which was prepared without consulting General Headquarters India due to the short time available, figure in theDefence Committee Paper D.O. (46) 68 dated 12 June 1946, entitled 'India – Military Implications of Proposed Courses of Action'. It is a remarkable document, which reveals the difference in the mind sets of 'imperialists' in London and the 'liberals' in Delhi. It also casts doubts on the intentions of the British Government, regarding granting independence to India.
Right at the beginning, the Chiefs of Staff – Alanbrooke, Cunningham and Tedder – spelt out the strategic requirements of Britain in India in any future war. It was emphasised that Britain should have recourse to India's industrial and manpower potential, and should be able to use her territory for operational and administrative bases, and air staging posts. It was therefore important that India should be secure from external aggression and internal disorder. For defence purposes, it was essential that she should remain a single unit. These were surprising assertions, considering that even at that moment, the Cabinet Mission was in Delhi, discussing with Indian leaders the form of self-governance that was to be introduced. It was also inconsistent with the Viceroy's stated views about giving India self-government as quickly as possible.
Before proceeding to examine the military implications of the courses proposed by the Cabinet Mission, the Chiefs of Staff eliminated the first three. The first and second courses that envisaged a complete withdrawal, with or without a time limit, were ruled out since they did not safeguard Britain's strategic interests. The third course of appealing to the United Nations had the disadvantage of freezing military action while the case was being debated, and was therefore unacceptable. That left only two courses viz. maintaining control throughout India and a withdrawal in phases, which they proceeded to examine. The most important factor in retaining hold over the whole country was the ability to maintain law and order, which depended largely on the loyalty of the Indian armed forces. The conclusions on this crucial aspect were in line with those of General Headquarters India. ' ….we consider that the reliability of the Indian Army as a whole, including those in garrisons outside India is open to serious doubt. This applies even to Gurkha units….The Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force cannot be regarded as reliable'.
An important part of the Report deals with the reinforcements required to deal with internal disorders, based on estimates given by the Commander-in-Chief, India. In case the Indian Armed Forces remained loyal, it was estimated that in addition to the existing British forces then in India, reinforcements of three brigade groups and five air transport squadrons would be required. In the event of Indian troops becoming disaffected, the existing British forces and reinforcements mentioned earlier would be employed to hold key areas. To restore the situation in case of widespread disorder, additional reinforcements `required would be between four and five British divisions, for which considerable administrative backing would also be needed. The Indian formations serving overseas would also have to be replaced by British formations. The requirement of reinforcements outside India was visualized as six brigades in Burma and Malaya; two brigades in Hong Kong and Japan; two battalions in the Dodecanese and three battalions in Iraq. The total British reinforcements thus came to five divisions for India; six brigades for Burma and Malaya and three battalions for Iraq.
The Report examined the availability of reinforcements and implications of providing them. There was at that time one British division in the Middle East; two in Greece; one in Italy and one division and seven brigades in Germany. Apart from the fact that pulling them out from these theatres would have serious security implications, it would need at least four months to move all the troops, equipment and vehicles to India, and that too at the expense of merchant shipping and vessels then engaged in carrying personnel home under demobilisation and repatriation programmes. The implications of maintaining the existing units in India up to their present strength would make it necessary to stop release in the formations concerned. In the interest of equality of treatment, it may become necessary to suspend release throughout the army and the other services. These would have a serious effect on morale as well as political repercussions. .
The last course proposed by the Cabinet Mission was granting independence to Hindustan and withdrawing to Pakistan, comprising North-Western and North-Eastern India. This had several political and military implications, the most important being the division of India, which would preclude the establishment of a central authority to deal with defence, and in turn prejudice the future security of India against external attack. The armed forces would have to be reorganized and while India would have a strong army immediately, it would take many years for Pakistan to form an effective army of her own, making her susceptible to raids from the tribes on the North West Frontier. There would be communal riots in the Punjab due to the large Hindu population in the area under British control in Pakistan. In Hindustan, the Muslims may be ill-treated. In the worst case, there may even be civil war, leading to British troops being involved in fighting with Hindustan and controlling communal strife in parts of Pakistan which have Hindu minorities. The Report concluded that withdrawal into Pakistan would not safeguard British strategic interests, could lead to civil wars and in the event that Congress opposed it, even lead to war. Hence, this option was completely unacceptable on military grounds.
The Report ended with the conclusions, which stated:
….A policy of remaining in India and firmly accepting responsibility for law and order would result, if the Indian Army remained loyal, in an acceptable military commitment and would safeguard our long term strategic interests….If however, the Indian Armed Forces did not remain loyal… we would be faced with the necessity of providing five British divisions for India, with the consequent abandonment of commitments in other areas hitherto regarded as inescapable, serious effects on our import and export programmes and world-wide repercussions on the release scheme. The only alternative to this would be ignominious withdrawal from the whole of India. (Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London) vii, pp. 889-900.)
with regards
Maj Gen VK Singh, veteran
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