India's Ministry of Defence (MoD) is unique in most aspects
by Major General Mrinal Suman
. No other country can boast of such a set-up. Not convinced? Read on.
Responsibility for India's national defence is discharged through MoD, which
provides the policy framework and wherewithal to the armed forces. MoD has
five Secretaries, heading different departments. Here is a closer look at
their functioning.
Department of Defence (DoD)
According to the Allocation of Business Rules of the government, the Defence
Secretary heads DoD that is responsible for the defence of India and every
part thereof, including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be
conducive in times of war. In other words, he is tasked to ensure the
defence of the country. Surprised? Yes, it is his responsibility and not
that of the Service Chiefs.
For such an onerous responsibility, it is natural to expect a highly
experienced defence expert/veteran to be occupying the chair. After all, to
ensure defence of the country (including preparation and execution) is no
routine job. But MoD is different. Any bureaucrat can foot the bill, even if
he cannot differentiate between a mortar and a howitzer or a rocket and a
missile.
India has had Defence Secretaries whose earlier service had been limited to
Rural Development, Panchayati Raj, Fisheries and Animal Husbandry. Most do
not know even the basics of defence imperatives. To mask their ignorance and
inadequacy, they resort to the time-tested expedient of deferring
decision-making. India is the only country that considers experience in
fisheries or handlooms to be good enough to equip a bureaucrat to handle
defence of India. No wonder we claim 'Mera Bharat Mahan'.
Department of Defence Production (DDP)
Development of indigenous defence industry is DDP's prime responsibility.
Although DDP has a vast domain of 39 ordnance factories and 9 defence public
sector undertakings, the performance of DDP has been pathetic to say the
least. It is solely responsible for the current pitiable state of the
indigenous defence industry, wherein India remains dependent on imports for
70 percent of its defence requirements.
The world over, promotion of defence industry is considered to be a highly
specialised assignment. However, India is an exception. Any bureaucrat can
be appointed as Secretary DDP. Some come with no experience of industry or
defence. Their incompetence manifests itself in their prejudiced and
blinkered approach towards the private sector. Blocking the entry of the
private sector to ensure regular flow of orders to the public sector becomes
their sole mission. Instead of exploiting the enormous technological prowess
of the private sector, DDP impedes its participation in defence production.
In all 'Buy and Make' cases, DDP always nominates a public sector unit to
receive technology for indigenous production. Instead of absorbing
technology, most units choose the easier path of assembling imported
sub-assemblies and selling to the services at a huge profit. The case of
TATRA vehicles exposed the rot that has set in. Rather than undertaking the
onerous task of manufacturing, most public sector units have become traders
of imported systems under DDP's patronage.
Utter failure of DDP can be gauged from the fact that India has acquired the
dubious distinction of being the largest importer of conventional weapons in
the world with 14 percent of the global share. Some achievement after seven
decades of independence! DDP ought to be ashamed of it. But, we still have
the audacity to claim 'Mera Bharat Mahan'.
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)
DRDO has 52 laboratories in multiple disciplines. It employs over 5,000
scientists and about 25,000 other scientific, technical and supporting
personnel. The track record of DRDO is abysmal to say the least – a
chronicle of false claims, tall promises, inexplicable delays and
sub-optimal products. It has the unenviable reputation of never developing
any equipment conforming to the parameters in the promised time-frame. Some
claim to infamy!
Although DRDO's annual budget is close to Rs 14,000 crore, its total success
is limited to the replication of some imported products (commonly called
'reverse engineering' and 'indigenisation'). Time and cost overruns are
taken for granted. The history of three key projects (Arjun tank, Light
Combat Aircraft and Kavery aero engine) undertaken by DRDO is a true
indicator of the gross inadequacy that afflicts it.
Failure to perform its primary task of developing weapon systems has forced
DRDO to delve into bizarre areas to justify its existence. Many will be
shocked to learn that DRDO expends defence funds on projects like developing
new breeds of angora rabbits, collecting newer varieties of orchids and
identifying sharpest chillies. No other country can boast of such defence
R&D, except 'Mera Bharat Mahan'.
Department of Ex-serviceman Welfare (DESW)
DESW deals with all resettlement, welfare and pensionary matters of
ex-servicemen. Strangely, not a single serving or retired soldier has been
posted to it. It is totally manned by bureaucrats. Interestingly, India
cannot have the Minority Commission without minority members or Women's
Commission without women; but it can have DESW without ex-servicemen.
Welfare of retired soldiers has been entrusted to the people who have never
faced a bullet and who know little about the challenges faced by the retired
soldiers. Hence, they cannot be faulted for their complete lack of empathy.
A comparison of DESW with the US Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) will
be enlightening. All the top officers of DVA are ex-servicemen. It is headed
by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Robert A. McDonald, a veteran of 82nd
Airborne Division. Most of the subordinate functionaries also possess
extensive military experience. They appreciate that soldiering is a unique
profession with challenging convolutions.
DESW has acquired notoriety as the first barricade of bureaucratic
negativity. Most proposals get rejected at DESW level itself. Instead of
looking after the welfare of veterans and standing up for their
rights/entitlements, DESW contests every judicial verdict that goes in
favour of ex-servicemen, war-widows and even war casualties. As a result,
troops and veterans view DESW as an antagonistic entity. India must be the
only country where MoD does not enjoy the trust of its veterans. What a sad
state of affairs in 'Mera Bharat Mahan'.
Defence Finance Division (Def Fin)
Defence Finance is responsible to examine all defence matters having a
financial bearing; render financial advice; assist in the formulation and
implementation of all schemes/proposals involving expenditure; and assist in
the formulation and implementation of defence plans. In other words, they
are custodians of government funds and oversee all defence expenditure.
Notwithstanding the colourful taxonomy of Defence Financial Advisors,
Defence Finance officials are ill-equipped to provide any financial advice.
Most are graduates in subjects like Sanskrit, English Literature and
History. As they are not familiar with even the basics of finance or
economics, it is unfair to expect them to grasp minutiae of financial
imperatives. How can officials who know nothing of finance and are totally
ignorant of defence issues contribute to the evolution of a sound defence
finance plan?
What to talk of rendering advice, Defence Finance officials are incapable of
even doing their basic job of account keeping. In March 2016, the Defence
Minister shocked the nation by revealing that India's USD 3 billion were
lying forgotten with the US government for years, without earning any
interest. Worse, India continued to make fresh payments to the US for new
weaponry. Whether it was a case of ill-management, lack of attention or
sheer incompetence, it could have happened only in 'Mera Bharat Mahan'.
Finally
As can be seen, MoD is responsible for all facets of national defence.
Unfortunately, it suffers from major fundamental flaws in its organisation
and functioning. It is entirely manned by bureaucrats and officials who are
clueless about defence matters. The service headquarters are mere attached
offices. They do not form part of the decision making apparatus.
MoD is a citadel of bureaucracy and is totally devoid of professionalism.
The world abhors dealing with it. Since 2014, a measly sum of USD 1.12
million has come in as FDI despite the government raising the cap to 100
percent. Incompetence results in vacillation and lack of decision making;
and that dissuades all prospective investors.
Most disappointingly, the political leadership remains a powerless
spectator. Howsoever broad Modi's chest may be and howsoever well-meaning
Parrikar may be; bureaucracy continues to call the shots and not a single
(yes, not a single) reform has been implemented during the last two years.
All those pre-election boasts have proved to be mere baloney. MoD carries on
functioning in its lethargic and inept manner. Hopefully, our chants of
'Mera Bharat Mahan' will continue to deter potential enemies of India.
*****
(http://www.sify.com/news/why-defence-ministry-hasnt-seen-any-reform-in-last-two-years-news-columns-qimm3sddjhjjd.html)
(http://mrinalsuman.blogspot.in/2016_08_01_archive.html)
by Major General Mrinal Suman
. No other country can boast of such a set-up. Not convinced? Read on.
Responsibility for India's national defence is discharged through MoD, which
provides the policy framework and wherewithal to the armed forces. MoD has
five Secretaries, heading different departments. Here is a closer look at
their functioning.
Department of Defence (DoD)
According to the Allocation of Business Rules of the government, the Defence
Secretary heads DoD that is responsible for the defence of India and every
part thereof, including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be
conducive in times of war. In other words, he is tasked to ensure the
defence of the country. Surprised? Yes, it is his responsibility and not
that of the Service Chiefs.
For such an onerous responsibility, it is natural to expect a highly
experienced defence expert/veteran to be occupying the chair. After all, to
ensure defence of the country (including preparation and execution) is no
routine job. But MoD is different. Any bureaucrat can foot the bill, even if
he cannot differentiate between a mortar and a howitzer or a rocket and a
missile.
India has had Defence Secretaries whose earlier service had been limited to
Rural Development, Panchayati Raj, Fisheries and Animal Husbandry. Most do
not know even the basics of defence imperatives. To mask their ignorance and
inadequacy, they resort to the time-tested expedient of deferring
decision-making. India is the only country that considers experience in
fisheries or handlooms to be good enough to equip a bureaucrat to handle
defence of India. No wonder we claim 'Mera Bharat Mahan'.
Department of Defence Production (DDP)
Development of indigenous defence industry is DDP's prime responsibility.
Although DDP has a vast domain of 39 ordnance factories and 9 defence public
sector undertakings, the performance of DDP has been pathetic to say the
least. It is solely responsible for the current pitiable state of the
indigenous defence industry, wherein India remains dependent on imports for
70 percent of its defence requirements.
The world over, promotion of defence industry is considered to be a highly
specialised assignment. However, India is an exception. Any bureaucrat can
be appointed as Secretary DDP. Some come with no experience of industry or
defence. Their incompetence manifests itself in their prejudiced and
blinkered approach towards the private sector. Blocking the entry of the
private sector to ensure regular flow of orders to the public sector becomes
their sole mission. Instead of exploiting the enormous technological prowess
of the private sector, DDP impedes its participation in defence production.
In all 'Buy and Make' cases, DDP always nominates a public sector unit to
receive technology for indigenous production. Instead of absorbing
technology, most units choose the easier path of assembling imported
sub-assemblies and selling to the services at a huge profit. The case of
TATRA vehicles exposed the rot that has set in. Rather than undertaking the
onerous task of manufacturing, most public sector units have become traders
of imported systems under DDP's patronage.
Utter failure of DDP can be gauged from the fact that India has acquired the
dubious distinction of being the largest importer of conventional weapons in
the world with 14 percent of the global share. Some achievement after seven
decades of independence! DDP ought to be ashamed of it. But, we still have
the audacity to claim 'Mera Bharat Mahan'.
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)
DRDO has 52 laboratories in multiple disciplines. It employs over 5,000
scientists and about 25,000 other scientific, technical and supporting
personnel. The track record of DRDO is abysmal to say the least – a
chronicle of false claims, tall promises, inexplicable delays and
sub-optimal products. It has the unenviable reputation of never developing
any equipment conforming to the parameters in the promised time-frame. Some
claim to infamy!
Although DRDO's annual budget is close to Rs 14,000 crore, its total success
is limited to the replication of some imported products (commonly called
'reverse engineering' and 'indigenisation'). Time and cost overruns are
taken for granted. The history of three key projects (Arjun tank, Light
Combat Aircraft and Kavery aero engine) undertaken by DRDO is a true
indicator of the gross inadequacy that afflicts it.
Failure to perform its primary task of developing weapon systems has forced
DRDO to delve into bizarre areas to justify its existence. Many will be
shocked to learn that DRDO expends defence funds on projects like developing
new breeds of angora rabbits, collecting newer varieties of orchids and
identifying sharpest chillies. No other country can boast of such defence
R&D, except 'Mera Bharat Mahan'.
Department of Ex-serviceman Welfare (DESW)
DESW deals with all resettlement, welfare and pensionary matters of
ex-servicemen. Strangely, not a single serving or retired soldier has been
posted to it. It is totally manned by bureaucrats. Interestingly, India
cannot have the Minority Commission without minority members or Women's
Commission without women; but it can have DESW without ex-servicemen.
Welfare of retired soldiers has been entrusted to the people who have never
faced a bullet and who know little about the challenges faced by the retired
soldiers. Hence, they cannot be faulted for their complete lack of empathy.
A comparison of DESW with the US Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) will
be enlightening. All the top officers of DVA are ex-servicemen. It is headed
by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Robert A. McDonald, a veteran of 82nd
Airborne Division. Most of the subordinate functionaries also possess
extensive military experience. They appreciate that soldiering is a unique
profession with challenging convolutions.
DESW has acquired notoriety as the first barricade of bureaucratic
negativity. Most proposals get rejected at DESW level itself. Instead of
looking after the welfare of veterans and standing up for their
rights/entitlements, DESW contests every judicial verdict that goes in
favour of ex-servicemen, war-widows and even war casualties. As a result,
troops and veterans view DESW as an antagonistic entity. India must be the
only country where MoD does not enjoy the trust of its veterans. What a sad
state of affairs in 'Mera Bharat Mahan'.
Defence Finance Division (Def Fin)
Defence Finance is responsible to examine all defence matters having a
financial bearing; render financial advice; assist in the formulation and
implementation of all schemes/proposals involving expenditure; and assist in
the formulation and implementation of defence plans. In other words, they
are custodians of government funds and oversee all defence expenditure.
Notwithstanding the colourful taxonomy of Defence Financial Advisors,
Defence Finance officials are ill-equipped to provide any financial advice.
Most are graduates in subjects like Sanskrit, English Literature and
History. As they are not familiar with even the basics of finance or
economics, it is unfair to expect them to grasp minutiae of financial
imperatives. How can officials who know nothing of finance and are totally
ignorant of defence issues contribute to the evolution of a sound defence
finance plan?
What to talk of rendering advice, Defence Finance officials are incapable of
even doing their basic job of account keeping. In March 2016, the Defence
Minister shocked the nation by revealing that India's USD 3 billion were
lying forgotten with the US government for years, without earning any
interest. Worse, India continued to make fresh payments to the US for new
weaponry. Whether it was a case of ill-management, lack of attention or
sheer incompetence, it could have happened only in 'Mera Bharat Mahan'.
Finally
As can be seen, MoD is responsible for all facets of national defence.
Unfortunately, it suffers from major fundamental flaws in its organisation
and functioning. It is entirely manned by bureaucrats and officials who are
clueless about defence matters. The service headquarters are mere attached
offices. They do not form part of the decision making apparatus.
MoD is a citadel of bureaucracy and is totally devoid of professionalism.
The world abhors dealing with it. Since 2014, a measly sum of USD 1.12
million has come in as FDI despite the government raising the cap to 100
percent. Incompetence results in vacillation and lack of decision making;
and that dissuades all prospective investors.
Most disappointingly, the political leadership remains a powerless
spectator. Howsoever broad Modi's chest may be and howsoever well-meaning
Parrikar may be; bureaucracy continues to call the shots and not a single
(yes, not a single) reform has been implemented during the last two years.
All those pre-election boasts have proved to be mere baloney. MoD carries on
functioning in its lethargic and inept manner. Hopefully, our chants of
'Mera Bharat Mahan' will continue to deter potential enemies of India.
*****
(http://www.sify.com/news/why-defence-ministry-hasnt-seen-any-reform-in-last-two-years-news-columns-qimm3sddjhjjd.html)
(http://mrinalsuman.blogspot.in/2016_08_01_archive.html)
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