Turning Point in Kargil
AN EXCELLENT AND ONE OF THE VERY FINEST ARTICLES ON KARGIL (TOLOLING)
First published in Military History Magazine's July 2017 issue.
In the summer of 1999 one infantry battalion secured a hard-fought victory for the Indian army in its bitter mountain conflict with Pakistani forces.
At 7:30 p.m. on June 12, 1999, a mountain along India's de facto border with Pakistan seemed to erupt as more than 120 artillery shells landed simultaneously on its peak. The exploding rounds intermittently lit the mountain against the dark sky before smoke obscured its summit. Indian gunners fired their howitzers directly at the solitary peak, and at close range the fire was devastating. To the soldiers of 2nd Battalion, Rajputana Rifles Regiment (2 Raj Rif), huddled along the mountain's southern approaches, the intense bombardment was only slightly reassuring.
Major Vivek Gupta, leading the reserve platoon of the Indian regiment's Company C on the mountain's southeastern spur, had to look away from the conflagration atop the peak. The men's eyes had long adjusted to the darkness and the bright flashes lingered stubbornly in their vision. They could do nothing about the concussive force of the exploding shells except to continue climbing. Gupta scrambled on, sometimes on all fours, the handpicked soldiers around him mirroring his movements. When they reached their jumping-off point, they paused to catch their breath in the thin mountain air. Ahead, his two leading platoons were preparing to assault the ridge.
Suddenly, the radio crackled with voices and the tinny staccato of small-arms fire. Company D was advancing up the mountain's southwestern spur, and the enemy atop the summit had discovered the advance. Gupta settled back and dug his boots into the arid soil. If the enemy had already spotted and engaged Company D, no matter—its assault was a feint. The maneuver would draw the enemy westward, away from Company C, which would make the final assault straight up the exposed mountainside.
When India and Pakistan gained their independence from Britain in mid-August 1947, it was a twin birth so bathed in blood that the two nations remain bitter foes. Arguably the most contentious issue is the status of Jammu and Kashmir, a Muslim-majority Indian state in the Himalayan foothills. Pakistan claims the northern part of the region, and three initial wars the two nations fought over the area—in 1947–48, 1965 and 1971—failed to resolve the dispute. The Simla Agreement, signed after the 1971 conflict, stipulated that neither country would attempt to alter the cease-fire line, dubbed the Line of Control, and neither party has expressed a real interest in converting that temporary boundary into a permanent border.
By early 1999 it seemed India and Pakistan were well on their way to improving their relationship. Nearly three decades had passed since their last direct war, and despite a Pakistan-backed insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and nuclear weapons tests by both countries in 1998, it appeared Islamabad was ready to discuss with New Delhi a bilateral solution to the Kashmir issue. But not all concerned parties supported a negotiated settlement, least of all the Pakistani army, which decided to act—covertly.
The focus of the generals' attention was India's National Highway 1. Winding eastward from Srinagar—summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir—to the mountainous Leh district, it is the main supply route for the Indian army's outposts along the Line of Control. Those stone bunkers on barren peaks at 16,000 feet and above were considered unsupportable during the winter due to heavy snowfall. Thus the local army brigade routinely left them vacant until drifts in the high passes began to melt in late spring.
Hoping to reignite the Kashmiri insurgency and internationalize the dispute, Pakistan's army launched Operation Badr ("full moon" in Arabic), sending soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry Regiment across the Line of Control in a phased infiltration across a 90-mile front. The troops occupied more than 120 vacant Indian outposts, erected stone fortifications covered with iron girders and corrugated metal, and stockpiled arms and supplies.
The new vantage points on the Indian high ground gave the Pakistanis clear, commanding views of the valley, enabling artillery batteries on their side of the border to accurately target Indian vehicular traffic snaking along National Highway 1. The audacious maneuver placed the Pakistani army's boot on India's lifeline in the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir.
Initial Indian efforts to provide air support to infantry assaults proved unsuccessful, as Mi-17 helicopters like the one above struggled at high altitudes. (Vijay Gupta/Getty Images)
In early May shepherds in the Kargil district, on the Indian side of the Line of Control, informed the local Indian brigade commander of heavily armed men atop the ridges. Lieutenant Saurabh Kalia and his five-man patrol went to investigate but vanished; it was later determined they had been captured and tortured to death. As reports of additional ambushes poured in, and local Indian units proved unable to evict the infiltrators, New Delhi approved Operation Vijay ("victory" in Hindi), initiating the redeployment of nearly 30,000 troops to Kargil.
Even as local Indian commanders continued to downplay the extent of the incursions in their areas of responsibility, mounting pressure from political and army leadership provoked several infantry battalions to attack early. But the Indian soldiers who rapidly deployed from the lower altitude and hot clime of the Kashmir Valley were physically unprepared for the thin mountain air and single-digit temperatures. Furthermore, they had scant intelligence about enemy positions or strength, and the inhospitable terrain along the Line of Control hindered movement and resupply. Thus these early responding units suffered terribly. Pinned down on exposed mountainsides, some assault teams went days without food or water, subsisting on snow and cigarettes.
While Indian units struggled to grasp the full extent of infiltration along the Line of Control, 2 Raj Rif was conducting counterinsurgency operations 90 miles to the west. The commanding officer, 39-year-old Lt. Col. Magod Basappa Ravindranath, was an experienced veteran with three prior deployments. The battalion had just started settling into its area of operations when Ravindranath received orders to relocate to the Sonamarg transit camp. Given the urgency of the summons, he told his commanders to trim superfluous items and focus on rations, water, medical supplies and ammunition.
Ravindranath found the camp buzzing with activity, but no one had any reliable intelligence on the situation. All he could gather were sketchy reports of unidentified men—assumed to be Pakistani or Kashmiri insurgents—who had occupied the heights along National Highway 1 between the towns of Dras and Kargil. While firsthand knowledge was nonexistent, rumors abounded. As Ravindranath later noted, the hearsay "lionized Pakistani forces, interfered with planning and had a corrosive effect on morale." When the army called up 1st Battalion, Naga Regiment, which had fared poorly in its initial assaults, six of its officers went on sick call.
If he could not quell the rumors, Ravindranath reasoned, he could at least keep his battalion from hearing them. Relocating his men to an isolated valley 2 miles from the transit camp, he split the companies into their own areas of operation and set to work. He focused their efforts on the knowledge that successful mountain operations hinged on three elements: altitude acclimatization, flexible assault tactics and a sound logistical support plan.
Ill-equipped Indian units initially struggled in the unforgiving climate and terrain, though by June they received cold-weather gear and clothing. (Fayaz Kabli)
Given that ongoing operations were mountain assaults at elevations well above 10,000 feet, Ravindranath worked with battalion medical officer Captain Somnath Basu to devise an eight-day altitude acclimatization plan, starting with level walks and gradually increasing to faster and strenuous climbs to 15,000 feet with full battle load. The soldiers also ensured their small arms—a mix of 7.62 mm AK-series assault rifles and new, domestically produced 5.56 mm INSAS rifles—were properly zeroed for the thin mountain air.
Ravindranath knew the years his troops spent focused on counterinsurgency missions had dulled their ability to conduct conventional mountain operations, so all four companies ran mock assaults on nearby peaks, emphasizing flexible small-unit tactics against fixed enemy positions. It was crucial to maintain the initiative, Ravindranath repeatedly told his command team. "If you can find the solution to what causes your attack to bog down, the objective will be yours."
On June 1 the soldiers of 2 Raj Rif boarded trucks and moved east to the Dras sector, where a fierce battle raged on the heights. Shortly after the regiment's arrival, brigade headquarters ordered Ravindranath to recapture Tololing, a dominant peak looming 16,000 feet over National Highway 1 scarcely 3 miles northwest of town. Pakistani positions atop Tololing represented the deepest point of the Badr incursion, and Indian commanders counted on Ravindranath to establish a foothold from which the army could launch subsequent operations.
The 18th Battalion, Grenadiers Regiment, had initiated operations to recapture Tololing on May 22. As its companies made their way up the exposed slopes, heavy and coordinated Pakistani mortar and artillery fire stopped them cold. The grenadiers conducted three more assaults in vain, suffering more than 150 casualties. On May 28 an Indian air force Mil Mi-17 helicopter, struggling in the thin air as it provided fire support, was hit by a shoulder-fired missile and crashed on a nearby peak, killing its four-man crew. In response the air force suspended attack helicopter operations. On June 2, after the grenadiers' fourth desperate attempt to storm the peak, brigade headquarters ordered them to cease attacks, dig in as best they could and await relief. The next day the brigade handed the task of taking Tololing to 2 Raj Rif.
After linking up with the exhausted grenadiers and gathering intelligence from their officers, Ravindranath led his command team on extensive reconnaissance on June 5–6. Examining Tololing from the south, they noted two main ridgelines ascending to three distinct features at the summit. The southwest spur rose to a peak called Point 4590, for its altitude in meters. The ground then dropped and leveled off for 300 yards, a stretch code-named Area Flat, before rising sharply to the mountain's pinnacle, Tololing Top. To the north a knobby ridgeline dubbed the Hump bridged the rear of Tololing to nearby enemy-held Point 5140.
Ravindranath elected to send two companies up each spur—one attacking, the other in reserve—to split the Pakistanis' attention. Companies D and A, in turn, would advance up the southwest spur to attack Point 4590, while C and B would concentrate on Area Flat and Tololing Top. Meanwhile, the battalion's commando detachment, under Lieutenant Neikezhakuo Kenguruse, would position itself to the north near the Hump to isolate Tololing by fire, calling in artillery on any enemy forces trying to reinforce the summit. Ravindranath and his company commanders noted at least eight bunkers, with more hidden positions likely, and the assault teams would have to secure each of them and hold off inevitable counterattacks. There was, however, one silver lining—120 artillery guns had arrived in Dras and would support the assault, a crucial support element previously unavailable to the grenadiers. Indian commanders hoped the guns, many of them in low-trajectory direct-fire mode, would neutralize the Pakistanis' tactical advantages.
Despite the challenges, Lt. Col. M.B. Ravindranath prepared his battalion well for its mountain assault on Tololing. They recovered a trove of enemy small arms from the summit. (Fayaz Kabli)
Ravindranath established ammunition and water supply points on each axis of advance, and on the nights before the attack his men and 400 porters carried the weapons, ammunition, equipment, rations and medical supplies up the steep gradient in an exhausting, seven-hour climb to the firebases. By June 12 the buildup was complete, and the four companies, assembled at their launching points, spent the day huddled in defilade on Tololing's slopes under heavy clouds, waiting for darkness.
The earsplitting thunder of Brigadier Lakhwinder Singh's artillery batteries signaled the start of 2 Raj Rif's assault on Tololing. The gunners paused briefly, hoping to draw out the defenders, then resumed the barrage in earnest. Major Mohit Saxena began the infantry assault at 8:30 p.m., and Company D reached its initial objective within an hour. But Pakistani forces on Point 4590 detected the Indians' approach and engaged the attackers with machine gun and mortar fire. Saxena led the company forward, sprinting from boulder to boulder, until his men had closed to within 100 yards of the nearest Pakistani positions. Unable to advance farther, they sheltered behind a line of boulders and kept firing uphill, waiting for an opportunity.
Meanwhile, to the southeast, came Company C, which had started its advance 30 minutes after Company D. As the men climbed, the two leading platoons noticed the Pakistanis appeared to be falling for the feint, many of them scurrying west to face Saxena's attack. Seizing on their inattention, one of Company C's platoons rushed forward and took Area Flat—splitting the Pakistani-held terrain on Tololing—while the other platoon veered toward Tololing Top and rushed over its crest, suddenly appearing amid the enemy positions.
The alarmed Pakistanis began spraying automatic fire to scatter the attackers. As the men of the leading section scrambled forward, they failed to notice a well-concealed bunker on their flank; its machine gun killed all of them. The shock of their sudden loss threatened to stall the Indians' momentum, until 23-year-old Lieutenant Praveen Tomar stepped up to resume the assault.
With the Pakistani forces on Tololing Top focused on Tomar's platoon, Major Gupta, on standby with the reserve platoon, led his men up the right side of the spur. As Corporal Digendra Kumar followed him up the steep incline, he saw what appeared to be an exposed rock jutting from the snow and reached out to steady himself. Only when he closed his hand around the object did he realize it was a machine gun barrel. As Kumar instinctively grabbed hold of the barrel, the Pakistani gunner fired a burst, shooting the corporal through the hand and wounding him in the chest. Reacting with remarkable calm, Kumar armed a grenade, let it "cook" in his palm a moment, then tossed it through the bunker's firing slit. The explosion silenced the gun. As the platoon moved to assault the three remaining bunkers, it came under intense fire. Kumar field-dressed his own wounds and continued to crawl to high ground, all the while hurling grenades and firing his light machine gun.
The platoon's progress was marked by bitter close-quarters fighting. Amid the confusion Gupta and a Pakistani nearly collided in the darkness and, standing barely 6 feet apart, killed one another. By 2:30 a.m. the platoons had finally cleared the bunkers. Tomar updated Ravindranath and then scrambled to reorganize the company.
Over the next hour Pakistani soldiers fiercely counterattacked Company C on Tololing Top and Area Flat, trying to throw back the Indians before they could consolidate their positions. The Indians repulsed each attempt, but desperation set in as the company's casualties mounted and its ammunition ran low. Ravindranath rushed a platoon from Company B to reinforce C.
But confusion still reigned in the darkness. As Tomar awaited reinforcements, one of his NCOs pointed to a trio of unidentified men climbing toward their position. Both parties paused, anxiously trying to identify the other in the dim starlight. The NCO called out to them—only to realize they were Pakistani soldiers. In the fierce exchange of automatic fire that followed, Tomar was wounded in the leg, and the Pakistanis scrambled away.
As the men of Company B approached Tololing Top, Pakistani forces launched three more counterattacks in quick succession. The Indians held and by the third attempt had eliminated all resistance on Tololing Top. Before anyone could celebrate, however, 2 Raj Rif's commando detachment radioed reports of Pakistani reinforcements rushing south toward the summit from Point 5140. The Indians immediately called in accurate artillery strikes along the Hump, stopping the surge. Ravindranath then led Company B to reinforce the summit, and at 4:10 a.m. he radioed brigade headquarters with a simple message: "Sir, I am on Tololing Top."
Pakistani soldiers still held positions on Point 4590. Almost certainly realizing they were surrounded, they directed fire across Area Flat up toward Tololing Top. With dawn rapidly approaching, Ravindranath could either isolate Point 4590 and attack it later that day, or order Company A to clear it. He chose the latter.
Holding Company A in reserve on the southwestern spur, Major Padmapani Acharya and Lieutenant Vijyant Thapar had been eager to get into the fight and quickly advanced through Company D's position to launch their assault. As the defenders fell back, Corporal Tilak Singh set up his light machine gun on high ground overlooking one of the last enemy-held bunkers. He watched as two Pakistanis—one dressed in a tracksuit, the other in civilian clothes—retreated inside. After repeated calls to show themselves, the two emerged, but one still held his assault rifle and, inexplicably, kept switching it nervously from one hand to the other. Someone fired, and both Pakistanis were killed in the ensuing commotion.
Company A mopped up the remaining resistance, while Company B pushed on and cleared the northern slopes of Tololing. Around 6:15 a.m. on June 13, with the sun rising over the mountains of Dras, Ravindranath informed brigade headquarters 2 Raj Rif had achieved its objective: Tololing was secure. It was his 40th birthday.
Despite repeated denials from Islamabad of army participation in the incursion, Indian troops identified the enemy dead, shrouded in flags above, as members of Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry Regiment. (Fayaz Kabli)
The capture of the Tololing complex by 2 Raj Rif marked the end of the first phase of the Kargil conflict. M.B. Ravindranath's professionalism, methodical planning and emphasis on flexible tactics—coupled with the courage and determination of his platoon and section leaders—had enabled his battalion to secure a difficult objective. The mountain provided a much-needed foothold from which to push the Pakistanis back north of the Line of Control. The gains came at a cost, however. The battalion had lost 10 killed and 25 wounded in the fight for Tololing. The Pakistani defenders had suffered twice as many killed and an unknown number wounded; captured documents revealed they were from Company D, 6th Battalion, Northern Light Infantry.
On June 16 another infantry battalion relieved 2 Raj Rif and assumed responsibility for Tololing, giving the men an opportunity to rest and refit. By month's end Ravindranath would be ordered to lead 2 Raj Rif in the recapture of a trio of craggy mountains with reinforced enemy positions, limited avenues of approach and pre-sighted artillery. The punishing task would claim the lives of three more officers and 10 soldiers and wound another 52 men. But for the moment, in the wake of their remarkable and hard-fought victory at Tololing, the men of 2 Raj Rif took time to clean their weapons, eat square meals and catch up on much-needed sleep.
Paraag Shukla is the senior editor of World War II and Aviation History. For further reading he recommends Conflict Unending, by Sumit Ganguly, and Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella, by Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair and Jamison Jo Medby.
First published in Military History Magazine's July 2017 issue.
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